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A prominent objection against the logicality of second-order logic is the so-called
Overgeneration Argument. However, it is far from clear how this argument is to be
understood. In the first part of the article, we examine the argument and locate its
main source, namely, the alleged entanglement of second-order logic and math-
ematics. We then identify various reasons why the entanglement may be thought to
be problematic. In the second part of the article, we take a metatheoretic perspec-
tive on the matter. We prove a number of results establishing that the entanglement
is sensitive to the kind of semantics used for second-order logic. These results
provide evidence that by moving from the standard set-theoretic semantics for
second-order logic to a semantics which makes use of higher-order resources,
the entanglement either disappears or may no longer be in conflict with the logic-
ality of second-order logic.
1. Introduction
A certain brand of nominalism bans properties and other entities
thought to lack well-defined identity criteria. Quine (1956) went as
far as calling such entities ‘creatures of darkness’. Nominalistic scru-
ples of this kind have been a source of concern about second-order
logic, for second-order logic allows quantification into predicate pos-
ition, and it is natural to read this type of quantification as quantifi-
cation over properties.
In today ’s revival of metaphysics, these nominalist scruples
have much less traction. However, a different Quinean objection to
second-order logic remains high on the philosophical agenda. This
objection targets certain principles of second-order logic, known as
Comprehension Axioms, which assert the existence of second-order
entities. According to the objection, what makes second-order logic
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problematic is not the kind of entities to which this logic is committed.
Rather, it is the fact that there are entities to which it is committed.
Whether the second-order quantifiers range over properties or exten-
sional entities such as sets, these ontological commitments of second-
order logic are claimed to be in tension with its status as pure logic.
Seminal work of George Boolos (1984, 1985) has paved the way for
an interpretation of second-order logic in terms of plural quantifica-
tion which promises to sidestep this objection. More recently, Agustı´n
Rayo and Stephen Yablo (2001) have offered an alternative interpret-
ation of second-order logic which also aims to undermine the objec-
tion. Both interpretations purport to offer a reading of second-order
quantification, and hence of the Comprehension Axioms, that is free
from ontological commitments.
Ontological concerns derive from the fact that in second-order logic
there are existential validities, as witnessed by the Comprehension
Axioms. But even if such validities need not signal ontological com-
mitment, there might be validities of second-order logic, not neces-
sarily of the form 9XwðXÞ, which are problematic for its status as
logic. In particular, the possibility remains that the class of formal
validities of second-order logic exceeds the class of logical truths.
This is the starting point of another objection to second-order logic,
the so-called Overgeneration Argument. The argument is typically asso-
ciated with John Etchemendy ’s discussion in The Concept of Logical
Consequence (1990) and has received much attention in the literature
(see, for example, Priest 1995; Ray 1996; Hanson 1997, 1999; Go´mez-
Torrente 1998/9). However, it is far from clear how this argument is to
be understood, and recent attempts to reconstruct it have called its
significance into question (Parsons 2013; Paseau 2013; Griffiths and
Paseau 2016).
We shall offer an interpretation of the argument which locates
its main source in the entanglement of second-order logic and
mathematics. This interpretation vindicates the philosophical
significance of the argument by bringing to light the conflict that
lies at its heart, namely, that between the entanglement and the
alleged neutrality of logic. Where does this leave defenders of
second-order logic?
To address this question, we take a metatheoretic perspective on
the matter. We prove a number of results establishing that the
entanglement is sensitive to the kind of semantics used for
second-order logic. These results provide evidence that by moving
from the standard set-theoretic semantics for second-order logic to a
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semantics which makes use of higher-order resources, the entangle-
ment either disappears or may no longer be in conflict with the
neutrality of second-order logic.
2. Second-order logic and the Overgeneration Argument
One of the chief purposes of a formal system is to capture the relation
of logical consequence for natural language arguments.1 This typically
involves a process of formalization in which every natural language
sentence from a given target class is associated with a sentence in the
language of the formal system. We use S to denote the formalization of
a natural language sentence S. For simplicity, we assume the formal-
ization to yield a bijection.2 Thus when a formal sentence S is first
introduced, its natural language reading will simply be S. We extend
this notation to sets of sentences. Hence the set of sentences T will
consist of the formalizations of the natural language sentences in T.
A formal system comes equipped with notions of validity and en-
tailment specified in model-theoretic or proof-theoretic terms. These
formal notions are meant to correspond to the informal notions of
logical truth and logical consequence in the following sense. If the
formal sentence S is declared valid by the system, then its natural
language counterpart S should be a logical truth. In this case we say
that the system is sound with respect to logical truth. Conversely, if S is a
logical truth, then S should be declared valid by the system. In this
case we say that the system is complete with respect to logical truth.
Similar definitions can be given for logical consequence.
Friends of classical logic are agreed that first-order logic is sound
with respect to logical truth and consequence. However, some of them
have denied that it is also complete. To make up for this perceived
limitation, extensions of first-order logic have been advocated.
Second-order logic has a good claim to reduce this incompleteness
(see, for example, Shapiro 1991; Higginbotham 1998).
1 Here ‘natural language’ can be understood broadly, so as to include the semi-formal
language of mathematics, and indeed even interpreted formal languages.
2 This assumption is overkill. Note that both natural language sentences and formal sen-
tences are naturally divided into equivalence classes induced by the relations of logical equiva-
lence. Suppose that we have two operations, one mapping natural language sentences to formal
sentences, the other going in the opposite direction. What matters for our discussion is that
successive applications of these operations never take a sentence outside of its equivalence
class.
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As noted above, second-order logic extends first-order logic with
quantification into predicate position. Following custom, we use cap-
ital letters to denote second-order variables. At the deductive level, we
add rules for the second-order quantifiers and the Axiom Scheme of
Comprehension, which states that to every open formula with param-
eters there corresponds a property or relation. In symbols:
9Xn 8x1, …, xn ðXnx1, …, xn $ wðx1, …, xnÞÞ
where Xn is a second-order variable of nth degree. To simplify nota-
tion, we shall henceforth omit the superscript and let the context
disambiguate.
The usual model-theoretic semantics for second-order logic is set-
theoretic and has traditionally been developed in two ways, standard
and Henkin (see Shapiro 1991, pp. 70–76). Advocates of second-order
logic tend to restrict attention to the former. Standard semantics in-
terprets monadic second-order variables as ranging over all subsets of
the first-order domain, dyadic variables as ranging over all sets of
ordered pairs of objects from the domain, and so on.
The expressive power of second-order logic with standard semantics
goes well beyond that of first-order logic. Many notions that resist first-
order characterization, such as finiteness, infinity and countability, can
be captured semantically by second-order means. That is, there are
second-order sentences that hold in all and only interpretations with,
respectively, finite, infinite and countable domains. The price to be paid
is that any sound proof system is incomplete for standard semantics: if a
proof system doesn’t prove too much, it doesn’t prove enough. Less
colourfully, for any effective proof system, if every provable sentence is
true in all interpretations, then there are validities that cannot be
proved in the system. For this reason, defenders of second-order logic
normally focus on model-theoretic notions rather than proof-theoretic
ones. We will follow suit in the remainder of this article.
The fact that second-order logic affords the means of characterizing
important mathematical notions plays a role in its capacity to reduce
the alleged incompleteness of first-order logic with respect to logical
truth and consequence. Consider the following argument:
There is at least one thing.
There are at least two things.
There are at least three things.
:
; There are infinitely many things.
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Some (for example, McGee 2014) have taken the conclusion to be a
logical consequence of the premisses (analogous arguments are given
by Yi 2006 and Oliver and Smiley 2013). While this fact cannot be
captured in the usual first-order formalizations, it can be captured in
second-order logic (for instance, by regimenting the plural quantifier
in the conclusion with a second-order quantifier in the style of Boolos
1984). The Overgeneration Argument aims to establish that this par-
ticular attempt to reduce the incompleteness of first-order logic with
respect to logical truth and consequence goes too far. The greater
expressive power of second-order logic makes it unsound with respect
to logical truth (and hence, a fortiori, with respect to consequence).
Indeed, some of the notions that resist first- but not second-order
characterization are the main ingredients of the standard example of
the overgeneration of second-order logic (see, for example, Shapiro
1991, pp. 102–109). This example concerns the logical status of the
Continuum Hypothesis (henceforth CH), that is, the statement of
ordinary mathematical language that there is no cardinality between
that of the natural numbers and that of the real numbers. Although
overgeneration is a broader phenomenon, there are good reasons for
choosing CH. It is a concrete statement whose first-order formaliza-
tion can be neither proved nor disproved in ZFC, the first-order for-
malization of standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of
Choice (ZFC). Indeed, this remains the case even when those axioms
are supplemented with standard large cardinal hypotheses (Le´vy and
Solovay 1967; Hamkins and Woodin 2000).3
The fact that in second-order logic we can characterize the cardinal-
ity notions mentioned above provides the basis for further definitions.
We can define what it means for a property to have size aleph-0, to
have size aleph-1, and to have the size of the continuum (see the
Appendix for details). So we can express that there is no size between
that of the natural numbers (aleph-0) and that of the reals (con-
tinuum) by stating that any property has size aleph-1 if and only if
it has the size of the continuum. In symbols:
ðCH2Þ 8Xðaleph-1ðXÞ $ continuumðXÞÞ
CH2 is a pure sentence of second-order logic in that it does not con-
tain any non-logical vocabulary. What is more, given the standard
set-theoretic semantics for second-order logic and the associated
3 This, of course, holds modulo relevant consistency assumptions. For ease of readability,
we omit the qualification in the remainder of the paper.
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definition of validity, the following biconditional is provable from the
ZFC axioms: CH2 is valid if and only if CH is true.4 It follows from the
soundness and completeness of second-order logic with respect to
logical truth that CH is true if and only if CH2 is a logical truth.
Note that the validity of ‰CH2 is not equivalent to the negation of
CH. However, there is another pure sentence of second-order logic
which is valid if and only if CH is false, namely:
ðNCH2Þ 8Xðaleph-1ðXÞ ! ‰continuumðXÞÞ
Again, it follows from the soundness and completeness of second-
order logic with respect to logical truth that the negation of CH is
true if and only if NCH2 is a logical truth.
The connection between the truth or falsity of CH and second-
order validities usually provides the starting point of the
Overgeneration Argument. But how does this connection yield an
argument against the soundness of second-order logic with respect
to logical truth?
3. The interpretative problem
In a recent article, Alexander Paseau considers five interpretations of
the Overgeneration Argument (Paseau 2013). In four of them, the
conclusion of the argument is that CH is logically true. Paseau takes
this conclusion to be unacceptable, even on the assumption that CH is
true. However, he argues that in each of these four interpretations
either the conclusion does not follow from the premisses or one of the
premisses is not true.
In the other interpretation considered by Paseau, the conclusion is
not that CH is logically true, but that CH2 is. The argument goes as
follows:
(P1) CH2 is valid.
(P2) If CH2 is valid, then CH2 is a logical truth.
(C) CH2 is a logical truth.
This argument is valid, and Paseau takes its first premiss to be true on
the assumption that CH is true. The second premiss is just an instance
of the soundness of second-order logic with respect to logical truth. A
similar argument could be run from the assumption that CH is false
using NCH2 rather than CH2. Thus if the conclusion were
4 A proof is provided in Appendix B; see Theorem 2.
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unacceptable, the soundness of second-order logic with respect to
logical truth would have to be surrendered.
According to Paseau, however, the conclusion that CH2 is a logical
truth is not troubling. To buttress his point, he draws an analogy
between CH2 and the sentence ‘If there are two Fs and three Gs,
and no F is G, then there are five things that are F or G’. The first-
order formalization of this sentence is as follows:
ðARÞ ð92xFx ^ 93xGx ^ ‰9xðFx ^ GxÞÞ ! 95xðFx _ GxÞ
Now consider the following valid argument:
(P1*) AR is valid.
(P2) If AR is valid, then AR is a logical truth.
(C) AR is a logical truth.
As Paseau observes, this argument too has true premisses, and its
conclusion should be accepted as true. However, one should note
that in this case the truth of the conclusion can be established inde-
pendently by means of a derivation from what are assumed here to be
uncontentious logical principles. The conclusion that CH2 is a logical
truth does not enjoy a similar justification. The analogy Paseau draws
does not, therefore, support this conclusion.
Paseau offers some considerations as to why accepting CH2 as a
logical truth might not be problematic. In particular, he claims that
CH2 is ontologically neutral and topic-neutral. How are we to under-
stand these conditions on logicality? A natural suggestion is the fol-
lowing. First, a sentence is ontologically neutral if it does not constrain
how many objects there are, and second, it is topic-neutral if it is pure,
lacking any non-logical vocabulary.
One might take issue with the claim that CH2 is indeed ontologic-
ally neutral and topic-neutral. On the one hand, several authors have
argued that second-order quantifiers carry ontological commitment
(see, for example, Resnik 1988; Parsons 2013; Hazen 1993; Linnebo
2003; Shapiro 1993; Florio and Linnebo 2016). On the other hand,
there is the traditional Quinean view that non-logical notions are
hidden behind second-order notation (Quine 1986). But these consid-
erations are not specific to CH2, and concern second-order logic more
generally. Thus relying on them would reduce the Overgeneration
Argument to other traditional complaints against second-order
logic. The interest of the Overgeneration Argument lies primarily in
its promise not to rely on such complaints.
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In the following sections, we are going to develop an interpretation of
the Overgeneration Argument which incorporates the argument from
(P1) to (C) as an important step. The remaining steps will be motivated
by conditions on logicality other than those considered by Paseau. As a
result, the interpretation will be independent of the traditional com-
plaints against second-order logic just mentioned.
So what is the Overgeneration Argument? Because it concludes that
CH2 is a logical truth, Paseau considers the argument from (P1) to (C)
to be a poor interpretation. On his view, the Overgeneration
Argument’s conclusion is meant to be that CH is a logical truth,
not that some other sentence is. In support of his view, Paseau cites
several authors: Etchemendy (1990), Blanchette (2001), Shapiro (1998),
Hanson (1997) and Priest (1995). Whilst some of these authors make
remarks suggestive of Paseau’s interpretation, it is not clear whether
they are ultimately committed to it. There are admittedly interpret-
ative issues here, but one common feature of these discussions is that
they highlight the problematic character of the relationship between
the logical status of CH2 and the truth of CH. This relationship is
sanctioned by the biconditional stating that CH is true if and only if
CH2 is valid. Note that the right-to-left direction of this biconditional
does play a role in the argument from (P1) to (C), as it is implicitly
used to derive its first premiss (on the assumption that CH is true). By
incorporating the argument from (P1) to (C), our interpretation will
therefore make use of the right-to-left direction. Moreover, as we will
see, the left-to-right direction will also be involved in our interpret-
ation of the argument. This reliance on the biconditional vindicates its
important role in the literature by locating the main source of the
argument in the conflict between the biconditional and certain fea-
tures of logicality. Ultimately, however, we are less interested in exe-
getical accuracy than in articulating a genuinely new challenge for the
view that second-order logic is sound with respect to logical truth.
4. Entanglement and logicality
The problematic character of the assertion that CH is true if and only
if CH2 is valid was emphasized by Etchemendy in his original discus-
sion of the Overgeneration Argument:
The problem lies with our faulty account of the logical properties, which
mistakenly equates the logical status of [CH2] with the ordinary truth or
falsity of [the Continuum Hypothesis]. (Etchemendy 1990, p. 124)
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More generally, the literature contains frequent claims to the effect
that biconditionals of the following form are problematic:
w is true if and only if c is valid
where w and c are names of sentences. Besides the truth and falsity of
CH, relevant examples concern, for instance, the Axiom of Infinity
(Etchemendy 1990; Parsons 2013), the Axiom of Choice (Koellner,
2003), and the existence of various large cardinals (Shapiro 1991;
Parsons 2013).
These examples are manifestations of a more general phenomenon,
which we may call the entanglement of logic and mathematics. Those
who find the entanglement problematic fall into two camps. Some
hold that the entanglement is generally problematic. This is meant
to undermine the model-theoretic account of validity regardless of
whether the underlying logic is first- or second-order. A representative
of this view is Etchemendy:
The truth value of [some sentence] is guaranteed by the axiom of infinity,
which, though certainly not a matter of logic, is nonetheless a far more
comfortable assumption to make than either the continuum hypothesis or
its negation. … But the difference here does not show that there is anything
peculiar about the logic of second-order languages, or that, as it is
sometimes put, second-order logic is really ‘set-theory in disguise’.
(Etchemendy 1990, p. 124)
Others hold that is that it is a matter of degree whether the entangle-
ment is problematic. Therefore, the entanglement per se does not
undermine the model-theoretic account of validity. For instance,
Parsons writes:
‘When is the entanglement of a proposed logic with mathematics
problematic?’ The answer is surely that being problematic is a matter of
degree … One can hardly doubt that the entanglement of second-order
logic with mathematics is more problematic than that of first-order
logic. … Etchemendy seems to be demanding that if a sentence is not
logically true, this has to be by virtue of statements that are logical
truths …. I don’t see how this demand can be satisfied … Minimizing the
mathematical commitment of a metatheory of logic makes sense.
Eliminating it altogether does not. (Parsons 2013, pp. 158–9)
To make progress, we need to determine why the entanglement might
be thought to be problematic. Unfortunately, explicit considerations
on the matter are hard to come by, even in the writings of those who
accept the view. It seems to us that the problem is best viewed as a
conflict between the entanglement and the neutrality of logic. In
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2019  The Author(s) 2019.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly
cited. For commercial re-use, please contactjournals.permissions@oup.com
Metalogic and the Overgeneration Argument 9 D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
ind/fzy059/5290173 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 27 M
arch 2019
particular, some cases of entanglement are in tension with two puta-
tive features of logicality capturing the idea that logic should be neu-
tral. These features can be broadly described as follows:
Dialectical neutrality. Logic should be able to serve as a neutral
arbiter in disputes over non-logical matters.
Informational neutrality. Logic alone should not be a source of new
information
In the next two sections, we explain the exact nature of the conflict
between these two features of logicality and the entanglement of
second-order logic and mathematics. Following many discussions in
the literature, we will focus on the particular case of the biconditional
that CH is true if and only if CH2 is valid. As our discussion will make
clear, what matters for the Overgeneration Argument is the provability
of this biconditional in a given background theory. We will refer to
this provability as the entanglement of second-order logic with CH.
5. Dialectical neutrality
Dialectical neutrality articulates the idea that logic should be a neutral
arbiter in disputes, whether metaphysical, mathematical or scientific.
In the context of his discussion of modal logic as metaphysics, Tim
Williamson writes:
A natural meta-metaphysical hope is that logic should be able to act as a
neutral arbiter of metaphysical disputes, at least as a framework on which
all parties can agree for eliciting the consequences of the rival metaphysical
theories. (Williamson 2014, p. 212)
Although Williamson’s conclusion is that this hope should be aban-
doned, the idea of logic as a neutral arbiter has a long and influential
tradition (see MacFarlane 2000).
In the context of foundational disputes in mathematics, dialectical
neutrality is endorsed by Peter Koellner:
[W]hen [disputants] employ a logic to articulate their differences the logic
should be such that each party agrees on (i) what implies what and (ii) the
fact that logical validities are true. (Koellner 2010, p. 19)
The argument to be considered in this section aims to establish that,
given the entanglement of second-order logic with CH, second-order
logic cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in disputes over CH. The argu-
ment assumes the soundness and completeness of second-order logic
with respect to logical truth. Thus, if dialectical neutrality is to be
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upheld, one of these two assumptions has to go. Let us spell out the
argument.
Suppose that second-order logic is sound and complete with respect
to logical truth. And suppose that we want to allow for the possibility
of a dispute over CH in the context of ZFC. If second-order logic is to
serve as a neutral arbiter, settling the question of whether a statement
is a logical truth should not preclude that dispute. However, from the
supposition that CH2 is a logical truth, it follows that CH is true. And
from the supposition that CH2 is not a logical truth, it follows that
CH is false. This can be shown as follows.
In ZFC, one can prove that CH is true if and only if CH2 is valid,
which sanctions the entanglement of second-order logic with CH and
arises from the background set-theoretic semantics (see §2). Suppose
that CH2 is a logical truth. If we deny CH, we may infer from the
entanglement that CH2 is not valid. By completeness of second-order
logic with respect to logical truth, we may conclude that CH2 is not a
logical truth, which contradicts our assumption. Thus we must accept
CH. Suppose, on the other hand, that CH2 is not a logical truth. If we
accept CH, we may follow the argument from (P1) to (C) of §3. That
is, by soundness of second-order logic with respect to logical truth, we
may conclude that CH2 is a logical truth, thereby again obtaining a
contradiction. Thus we must deny CH. So whether or not we settle for
CH2 as a logical truth, a dispute over CH is precluded: second-order
logic cannot be a neutral arbiter in this dispute.
As is clear, both the soundness and completeness of second-order
logic with respect to logical truth are used in the argument. To pre-
serve dialectical neutrality, it seems we must reject one of those
assumptions. Which one? If the argument is to establish that second-
order logic overgenerates, the fault must lie with soundness. However,
our reconstruction of the argument brings to light that there might be
an alternative avenue of response, namely, denying completeness.
One might think that failure of completeness with respect to logical
truth is not worrisome. After all, as we mentioned above, first-order
logic may provide an example of a system that is sound but not
complete with respect to logical truth. Why is incompleteness toler-
able in this case? Consider the even simpler example of propositional
logic, another system that is arguably sound but not complete with
respect to logical truth. The reason for its incompleteness is obvious:
propositional formalization is insensitive to logically relevant features
of the target informal sentences (for instance, the presence of predi-
cates or determiners). The same is true of first-order logic, or so the
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second-order logician contends. However, incompleteness becomes
worrisome when we cannot point to logically salient features of the
target sentences that are not captured by the formalization. In the case
under consideration, these would have to be features of CH2, since the
argument only makes use of the particular instance of completeness
stating that if CH2 is a logical truth, then CH2 is valid. Unless this
challenge can be met, denying completeness is problematic.
Let us take stock. Dialectical neutrality appears to be in tension with
the soundness and completeness of second-order logic with respect to
logical truth. An important aspiration of second-order logic was to
reduce the incompleteness with respect to logical truth of its first-
order cousin. However, as the argument above shows, if logic is to be
dialectically neutral, this effort appears to go too far, putting soundness
with respect to logical truth in jeopardy. Failure to be sound with re-
spect to logical truth is the sense in which second-order logic would
overgenerate: there would be validities whose informal counterpart is
not a logical truth. This is the aspect of the problem emphasized by the
label ‘Overgeneration Argument’. As we have stressed, the argument
also relies on completeness with respect to logical truth, but its rejection
does not offer the second-order logician an easy way out. Should one
decide to give up completeness instead of soundness, the argument
would become an Undergeneration Argument: there would be logical
truths whose formalizations are not sanctioned as validities.
6. Informational neutrality
The second conflict between the entanglement of second-order logic
with CH and the neutrality of logic involves informational neutrality.
Recall the slogan for informational neutrality: logic alone should not
be a source of new information. A version of the slogan features in the
Tractatus, where Wittgenstein writes: ‘If p follows from q, the sense of
“p” is contained in that of “q”’ (Wittgenstein 1922, 5.122). The idea
behind the slogan is that the informational content of the logical
consequences of non-logical principles should be contained in those
principles. This is a common view about logical consequence, and is
intended to be consistent with the possibility of epistemic gains ob-
tained through deduction.5
5 In recent years, the issue has been discussed with reference to what Hintikka (1970,
p. 289) has called the ‘scandal of deduction’. See, for example, Sequoiah-Grayson 2008;
D’Agostino and Floridi 2009; Jago 2013.
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A colourful rendering of informational neutrality is given by Carl
Hempel, who also extends it to mathematics:
Thus, in the establishment of empirical knowledge, mathematics (as well as
logic) has, so to speak, the function of a theoretical juice extractor: the
techniques of mathematical and logical theory can produce no more juice
of factual information than is contained in the assumptions to which they
are applied; but they may produce a great deal more juice of this kind than
might have been anticipated upon a first intuitive inspection of those
assumptions which form the raw material of the extractor. (Hempel 1945,
p. 391)
A more recent example can be found in Panu Raatikainen’s discussion
of neo-logicism:
[I]f we accept as little as Q+ [Robinson arithmetic augmented with basic
second-order rules and a second-order induction axiom], the background
logic flings us directly to the powerful PA2 [second-order Peano
arithmetic]. … This is indeed a huge leap, and it is somewhat problematic
if it is allowed by the mere rules of the background logic. (Raatikainen
forthcoming, p. 14)
The problematic nature of the ‘huge leap’ presumably lies in the fact
that the application of basic second-order rules to relatively weak
theories yields theories which appear to have far greater informational
content. Thus, Raatikainen concludes, basic second-order rules cannot
count as logical.
Let us now turn to the argument for the second conflict. The ar-
gument divides into two steps. The first step is simply the argument
from (P1) to (C) of §3, which concludes that CH2 is a logical truth, on
the assumption that CH is true. As noted before, this step implicitly
uses the entanglement of second-order logic with CH.
The second step is as follows. We start from the following key
assumption: ZFC together with the thesis that second-order logic is
complete with respect to logical truth does not informationally con-
tain CH.6 By informational neutrality, it follows that if any additional
principle enables us to derive CH from ZFC plus completeness, the
additional principle cannot be a logical truth, for such an increase in
6 We intend our argument to be compatible with different notions of information. Indeed,
for our purposes, any notion that makes the key assumption true would do. One such notion
may be the following: a theory T informationally contains S if T entails S in second-order
logic. On this notion, ZFC does not informationally contain CH, and it is plausible to think
that neither does ZFC together with the thesis that second-order logic is complete with respect
to logical truth.
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informational content cannot be brought about by logical principles
alone.
With the help of the additional principle that CH2 is a logical truth,
we now derive CH from ZFC plus completeness. To this end, suppose
that CH2 is a logical truth. Then by the completeness of second-order
logic with respect to logical truth, it follows that CH2 is valid. Since
second-order logic is entangled with CH in ZFC given the background
set-theoretic semantics, we conclude that CH is true. This completes
the derivation.
Now, given the key assumption that ZFC plus completeness does
not informationally contain CH, we can apply informational neutral-
ity to the preceding derivation to conclude that the additional prin-
ciple is not a logical truth. That is, we can conclude that the principle
that CH2 is a logical truth is not itself a logical truth. Finally, we make
the plausible assumption that logical truth is an S5 modality.7 So the
fact that it is not a logical truth that CH2 is a logical truth implies that
CH2 is not a logical truth. But this contradicts the conclusion of the
first step of the argument, namely, that CH2 is a logical truth.
A couple of remarks are in order. First, the argument assumes that
CH is true. But this assumption can be dispensed with, since a parallel
argument can be run from its negation, using NCH2. Second, unlike
the argument from dialectical neutrality, the present argument invokes
only soundness of second-order logic with respect to CH.
Completeness features in a claim about containment, that is, the key
assumption that CH is not informationally contained in ZFC plus
completeness. Thus the argument from informational neutrality
cannot be resisted by denying completeness. This justifies the rejection
of soundness to the extent that the other assumptions are deemed
plausible. The conclusion appears to be, again, that second-order
logic overgenerates.
7. Higher-order semantics and entanglement
In the previous two sections, we saw that the neutrality of logic pro-
vides the basis for at least two arguments to the effect that second-
order logic overgenerates. The defender of second-order logic might
react by forgoing the neutrality of logic. This would be the response
favoured by Shapiro (1991, 2012) and anti-exceptionalists about logic
7 The fact that logical truth is an S5 modality has been defended by, for instance, John
Burgess (1999). Note that we only need Axiom 4 for the purposes of the argument.
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such as Williamson (2013, 2014). However, a different response might
be available. Both arguments were framed in the context of a set-the-
oretic semantics for second-order logic, the kind of semantics assumed
in discussions of overgeneration. We are now going to explore the
important but overlooked question of what happens to the entangle-
ment when second-order logic is given an alternative semantics. As we
shall see, this opens up the possibility of reconciling the neutrality of
logic with the soundness of second-order logic with respect to logical
truth.
Higher-order semantics is an alternative and increasingly popular
semantics that appeals to higher-order resources in the metatheory
(Boolos 1984, 1985; Rayo and Uzquiano 1999; Rayo 2002; Rayo and
Williamson 2003; Yi 2005, 2006; McKay 2006; Oliver and Smiley 2013).
In this semantics, higher-order expressions are not interpreted as
standing for set-theoretic entities. Rather, they are interpreted by
means of higher-order expressions in the metalanguage standing for
properties, pluralities or Fregean concepts. For current purposes, our
metatheoretic framework will be cast in terms of properties, but plur-
alities or concepts would also do. Our basic metatheory consists of the
standard principles of second-order logic, including second-order
Comprehension and a second-order version of the Axiom of
Choice, stating that there is a choice function corresponding to
every relation. Additional metatheoretic principles will be considered
below.
A delicate issue in higher-order semantics is how to characterize the
notion of satisfaction or truth in a model. A natural way of proceeding
is to introduce a primitive satisfaction predicate holding between an
interpretation—now construed as a second-order entity—and a for-
mula of the object language. In our case, however, this is not neces-
sary, since we will be concerned only with logical validity. More
specifically, as pointed out by Vann McGee (1997), validity and en-
tailment for arguments with finitely many premisses can be defined
using the second-order resources already available in our metatheory.
For simplicity, our object language will be L22, the second-order
language whose only non-logical symbol is 2, the membership predi-
cate of set theory. Now, let wU be the restriction of w ’s quantifiers
to U. Then we say that w is a higher-order validity if for every non-
empty property U and every relation E, w½E= 2U holds (where
w½E= 2 stands for the metalinguistic formula resulting from replacing
all occurrences of 2 in w with E). This, in effect, amounts to equating
validity to truth with respect to any higher-order domain and any
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higher-order reinterpretation of the membership predicate.8 On the
basis of this definition, one can further define entailment for
any argument with finitely many premisses, 1, …, n ; w. That is,
we say that the premisses entail the conclusion just in case
ð1 ^ … ^ nÞ ! w is a higher-order validity.
We now present an array of results that shed light on the entangle-
ment of second-order logic with CH in the context of higher-order
semantics. (Proofs are provided in the Appendix.) Analogous results
hold for the negation of CH.
Our first set of results indicates that a higher-order semantics does
not sanction the entanglement of second-order logic with CH in a
second-order metatheory obtained by a merely logical expansion of the
first-order set theory. Let us make this more precise. If T is a theory,
the second-order closure of T (denoted by T) is the set of sentences
derivable from T in our axiomatization of second-order logic. Our
focus will be on the status of the entanglement when we adopt as a
metatheory the second-order closure of ZFC (ZFC). Note, however,
that our results carry over to second-order closures of various exten-
sions of ZFC (see the Appendix for details).
We begin with a useful lemma, provable in pure second-order logic:
Equivalence Lemma. CH2 is true if and only if CH2 is a higher-order
validity.
For the next two theorems, we work in ZFC together with the as-
sumption that there is an v-model of ZFC. We have:
First Negative Theorem. ZFC does not prove that if CH2, then CH.
Second Negative Theorem. ZFC does not prove that if CH, then
CH2.
Thus neither direction of the equivalence of CH and CH2 is provable
in ZFC.
How about the informal counterpart of this result? That is, can the
equivalence of CH and CH2 be proved in ZFC? We think not. For
were there to be an informal proof of the equivalence of CH and CH2
from ZFC, such a proof could be turned into a formal proof of the
equivalence of CH and CH2 from ZFC. It seems to us that the situ-
ation is analogous to that arising from standard independence results
and their assumed significance for mathematical practice. The
8 For instance, the validity of 9x9y x 2 y will be equivalent to the truth of the following
statement: for every non-empty property U and every relation E, there are x and y having U
such that Exy.
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independence of CH from ZFC (Go¨del 1939; Cohen 1963) is usually
taken to show that CH is independent of ZFC.
But if there is no proof of the equivalence of CH and CH2 in ZFC,
then, given the lemma above, there is no proof of the equivalence of
CH and the validity of CH2 in ZFC. That is to say, in the presence of
minimal consistency assumptions, the entanglement of second-order
logic with CH is independent of ZFC.
It is worth clarifying the role played by higher-order semantics in
our results. Crucial use of this semantics was made in establishing the
Equivalence Lemma using pure second-order logic.9 Note, on the
other hand, that Negative Theorems are unprovability results. As
such, they concern what can be derived from ZFC. In this respect,
the semantics adopted for second-order logic is immaterial. The
proofs of these theorems given in the Appendix take place in a
meta-metalanguage where the second-order vocabulary is interpreted
set-theoretically.
The upshot of the foregoing results is that higher-order semantics
opens up the possibility of reconciling the dialectical and informa-
tional neutrality of second-order logic with its soundness and com-
pleteness with respect to logical truth, as both conflicts arose because
second-order logic is entangled with CH in ZFC if a set-theoretic
semantics is used. Since this is no longer the case in the new metathe-
ory, the conflict appears to have been resolved.
This is a significant conclusion. It shows that higher-order seman-
tics provides a framework in which the supporter of second-order
logic can overcome the two ways of spelling out the Overgeneration
Argument identified above. However, this assessment is dependent
upon the particular metatheory on which we have been focusing,
namely, the second-order closure of ZFC.
Our next two theorems show that if one allows the second-order
resources to feature in the set-theoretic axioms of the metatheory,
second-order logic is again entangled with CH. In particular, the en-
tanglement is sanctioned in a metatheory consisting of ZFC2—the
second-order theory obtained from ZFC by replacing the Axiom
Schema of Replacement with the corresponding second-order axiom.
In ZFC2, we can prove:
9 Indeed, when validity is construed according to the set-theoretic semantics, the
Equivalence Lemma is not even provable in ZFC. To see this, recall that ZFC, and hence
ZFC, proves that CH is true if and only if CH2 is set-theoretically valid. So if ZFC proved
that CH2 is true if and only if CH2 is set-theoretically valid, it would also prove that CH is
true if and only if CH2 is true, contradicting our Negative Theorems.
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First Positive Theorem. If CH2, then CH.
Second Positive Theorem. If CH, then CH2.
Given the Equivalence Lemma, it follows that in ZFC2, second-order
logic is entangled with CH. That is, ZFC2 proves that CH is true if and
only if CH2 is a higher-order validity. What does this mean for the
supporter of second-order logic who embraces higher-order
semantics?
In answering this question, the crucial observation is that ZFC2—
the formalization of ZFC2—remains quasi-categorical when moving
from a set-theoretic to a higher-order semantics. Let us elaborate.
First, observe that, since ZFC2 consists of finitely many axioms, we
can take the theory to be the conjunction of those axioms. Next, say
that F is a quasi-isomorphism between hU1, E1i and hU2, E2i if F is a
bijection between U1 and a subproperty of U2 or between U2 and a
subproperty of U1 such that F preserves the relations E1 and E2; that is,
if Fxy and Fuw, then E1xu if and only if E2yw. Then the following is
provable in pure second-order logic:10
Pure Internal Categoricity Theorem. For every U1, E1, U2, E2, if
ZFC2½E1= 2U1 and ZFC2½E2= 2U2 , then there is a quasi-isomorphism
between hU1, E1i and hU2, E2i.
From this theorem one can infer that ZFC2 decides CH according to
higher-order semantics. Let us sketch the argument (for details, see
Button and Walsh 2018, ch. 11). To start with, note that ZFC2 proves
by a simple existential introduction the existence of some U and E
such that ZFC2½E= 2U . Now, one can reformulate the set-theoretic
notion of a level Va of the cumulative hierarchy in terms of properties.
Then one can show that levels so defined can be well-ordered. It fol-
lows from ZFC2 that there must be a least such level U 0 such that, for
some E0, ZFC2½E0= 2U 0 . The Pure Internal Categoricity Theorem
implies that for any U and E such that ZFC2½E= 2U , there is a
quasi-isomorphism between hU , Ei and hU 0, E0i. Thus, for any sen-
tence S concerning the hierarchy below U 0, this holds: if
ZFC2½E1= 2U1 and ZFC2½E2= 2U2 , then S½E1= 2U1 if and only if
S½E2= 2U2 . But since CH can be formulated as a sentence concerning
a level below U 0 (in particular, the level corresponding to V!þ2), we
10 The result has been proved by Stewart Shapiro (unpublished manuscript) and follows
from a theorem of Va¨a¨na¨nen and Wang (2015) together with the fact that for every U1, E1, U2,
E2, if ZFC2½E1= 2U1 and ZFC2½E2= 2U2 , then there is a quasi-isomorphism between hOrd1, E1i
and hOrd2, E2i, where Ordn is the property of being an ordinal in Un with respect to En.
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have that if ZFC2½E1= 2U1 and ZFC2½E2= 2U2 , then CH½E1= 2U1 if
and only if CH½E2= 2U2 . On the basis of this fact, the higher-order
definition of entailment yields the following corollary.
Corollary. Either ZFC2 entails CH or it entails ‰CH.
With this observation in mind, we can proceed to reassess the argu-
ments from dialectical neutrality and informational neutrality. Let us
start with the argument from dialectical neutrality. One could run the
previous version of the argument almost verbatim. Suppose that
second-order logic is sound and complete with respect to logical
truth. And suppose that we want to allow for the possibility of a
dispute over CH in the context of ZFC2. If second-order logic is to
serve as a neutral arbiter, settling the question of whether a statement
is a logical truth should not preclude that dispute. However, in ZFC2,
one can prove that CH is true if and only if CH2 is a higher-order
validity. We now face a dilemma. Either CH2 is a logical truth or it is
not. Assume that it is. If we deny CH, we may infer from the entan-
glement that CH2 is not a higher-order validity. By the completeness
of second-order logic with respect to logical truth, we may conclude
that CH2 is not a logical truth, which contradicts our assumption.
Thus we must accept CH. Assume, on the other hand, that CH2 is not
a logical truth. If we accept CH, by the soundness of second-order
logic with respect to logical truth, we may conclude that CH2 is a
logical truth, thereby again obtaining a contradiction. Thus, whether
or not we settle for CH2 as a logical truth, a dispute over CH is
precluded.
A central assumption of the argument is that we want to allow for
the possibility of a dispute over CH in the context of ZFC2. The
corresponding assumption in the context of ZFC owes its plausibility
to the fact that ZFC, if consistent, entails neither CH nor ‰CH.
However, since ZFC2 entails either CH or its negation, one of
ZFC2 ! CH and ZFC2 ! ‰CH is a higher-order validity. This
means, in particular, that two parties who subscribe to ZFC2 cannot
agree on the logic while disagreeing on CH: once they agree on one of
these higher-order validities, they can settle the dispute by a simple
modus ponens. Thus dialectical neutrality appears to be violated quite
independently of the entanglement of second-order logic with CH. It
could be pointed out that ZFC2, if consistent, proves neither CH nor
‰CH (Weston 1977). But the genuine notion of consequence for our
defender of second-order logic is semantic. To insist on the syntactic
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notion of consequence is to dismiss at the outset the conception of
second-order logic that gives rise to the Overgeneration Argument.
Therefore the plausibility of the assumption that we should allow for
the possibility of a dispute over CH in the context of ZFC2 is under-
mined. So the argument from dialectical neutrality does not get off the
ground if the entanglement is established using ZFC2.
Let us now turn to the argument from informational neutrality.
Given the entanglement of second-order logic with CH in ZFC2,
one could try to run an analogue of the previous version of the argu-
ment using ZFC2. Whereas the previous version of the argument
relied on the assumption that CH is not implicitly contained in
ZFC, the new version would rely on the assumption that CH is not
implicitly contained in ZFC2. But the two assumptions are not on a
par. The first is supported by the undecidability of CH from ZFC,
even if supplemented with standard large cardinal hypotheses. In con-
trast, it follows from the Pure Internal Categoricity Theorem that
ZFC2 semantically decides CH. Thus one cannot simply assume
that CH is not implicitly contained in ZFC2.11 This blocks the argu-
ment from informational neutrality when the metatheory encom-
passes ZFC2.
8. Conclusion
We have advanced two novel reconstructions of the Overgeneration
Argument. These reconstructions vindicate the view that the
Overgeneration Argument poses a significant challenge, and therefore
deserves a place among the standard objections to second-order logic.
Just as in the case of the other objections, the Overgenertion
Argument makes use of the assumption that logic has certain features.
In our reconstructions of the argument, the relevant features are dia-
lectical and informational neutrality.
A staunch defender of second-order logic could take issue with the
assumption that logic has these features. Our results establish that she
need not do so. Instead, she can regard the Overgeneration Argument
as an argument for adopting a higher-order semantics. This is because
in this semantics the entanglement of second-order logic with CH
either disappears or becomes unproblematic. On the one hand,
11 Indeed, according to the notion of information mentioned above in footnote 6, ZFC2
informationally contains CH.
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there is no entanglement if the background set theory is essentially
first-order. On the other hand, the entanglement is no longer prob-
lematic in the context of a stronger background set theory which
makes full use of second-order resources. For the arguments from
dialectical and informational neutrality assume, respectively, that a
dispute over CH is legitimate and that CH is not informally contained
in the background theory. But the stronger background theory seman-
tically decides CH, which undermines both assumptions. Thus neither
argument is available.
Our focus in this article has been on the paradigm example of the
entanglement of second-order logic and mathematics, namely, the one
arising from CH. Other cases of entanglement may be thought to be
problematic, such as those involving the Axiom of Choice or the ex-
istence of large cardinals. An interesting question emerging from our
discussion concerns their status when second-order logic is given a
higher-order semantics. The generality of the techniques used here
suggests that analogues of our results might be obtained for those
cases too. This will be investigated in future work.
Although the use of higher-order semantics has received much at-
tention in the recent philosophical literature, this has typically been in
the context of attempts to provide second-order logic with its in-
tended interpretation. However, the consequences of adopting a
higher-order semantics for second-order logic are far-reaching, and
remain to be fully explored. Our findings show that, perhaps surpris-
ingly, this semantics can also help vindicate the neutrality of second-
order logic.12
12 This work has received funding from a Leverhulme Research Fellowship held by
Salvatore Florio and from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 758540)
within Luca Incurvati’s project From the Expression of Disagreement to New Foundations for
Expressivist Semantics. For comments and discussion, we would like to thank Neil Barton, Tim
Button, Catrin Campbell-Moore, Mario Go´mez-Torrente, Volker Halbach, Dan Isaacson,
Nicholas Jones, Øystein Linnebo, Martin Lipman, Beau Madison Mount, Carlo Nicolai, Alex
Paseau, Agustı´n Rayo, Sam Roberts, Ian Rumfitt, Gil Sagi, Stewart Shapiro, Florian
Steinberger, Jack Woods, and the referees and editors of Mind. Earlier versions of this material
were presented at the universities of Amsterdam, Chieti-Pescara, Hamburg, Oslo, Oxford and
Tu¨bingen, as well as the Institute of Philosophy in London, the Kurt Go¨del Research Center
for Mathematical Logic in Vienna, and the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. We
are grateful to the members of those audiences for their valuable feedback.
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9. Appendix
9.1 Notation and definitions
A property B is a subproperty of another A (in symbols: BvA) if, for
every x, Bx only if Ax. If the containment is proper, we write B@A.
The set-theoretic formula stating that the set f is a bijection between
a and b is abbreviated as a ﬃf b. We write a ﬃ b when a ﬃf b for
some f. Likewise, the second-order formula asserting that the second-
order relation F is a bijection between A and B is abbreviated as
A ﬃF B. By analogy with the set-theoretic case, we write A ﬃ B
when A ﬃF B for some F.
For any property X, {X} denotes the set whose elements have X.
That is,
8y ðy 2 fXg $ XyÞ
Note that {X} need not exist. This is the case, for instance, when X is a
universal property.
Conversely, for any set a, let Xa be the property X such that
8y ðXy $ y 2 aÞ
Second-order Comprehension implies that Xa exists whenever a does.
There are two types of cardinality notions. The first type concerns the
set-theoretic definition of notions such as finiteness, countable infinity
(aleph-0), aleph-1, and continuum. The second type concerns the
second-order rendering of the same notions. We use lower-case letters
to stand for the set-theoretic notions and small capital letters to stand
for the second-order ones. All these notions, and the associated nota-
tion, will feature in both the object language and the metalanguage.
We define infinity according to the Dedekind characterization. A set
a is infinite if there is some b  a such that b ﬃ a, otherwise it is finite.
A set a is countably infinite if a is infinite and any b  a is either finite
or b ﬃ a. A set is aleph-0 if it has the cardinality of countably infinite
sets. Moreover, a set a is aleph-1 if a is neither finite nor aleph-0, and
any b  a is finite, aleph-0, or b ﬃ a. Finally, a set a is the size of the
continuum (or continuum for short) if there is a set b such that b is
aleph-0 and PðbÞ ﬃ a.
Parallel definitions can be given in the language of pure second-
order logic. A property A is INFINITE if there is some B@A such that
B ﬃ A, FINITE otherwise. A property A is COUNTABLY INFINITE if A is
INFINITE and any BvA is either FINITE or B ﬃ A. A property is ALEPH-
0 if it has the cardinality of COUNTABLY INFINITE properties. Moreover, a
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property A is ALEPH-1 if A is neither FINITE nor ALEPH-0, and any BvA is
FINITE, ALEPH-0, or B ﬃ A.
In order to define the second-order counterpart of being con-
tinuum, we need to define an auxiliary notion. Say that a relation R
codes a bijection between A and the subproperties of B just in case the
following conditions are met:
(i) For every CvB, there is some x such that Ax and for every
y Rxy if and only if Cy.
(ii) Whenever x and y have A, the fact that for every z Rxz if and
only if Ryz implies that x = y.
If R codes a bijection between A and the subproperties of B, we say
that x is the code of C vB (relative to R) if the following condition is
met: for every y, Rxy if and only if Cy.
We define a property A to be the SIZE OF THE CONTINUUM (or
CONTINUUM for short) if there is some B such that B is ALEPH-0 and
there is a relation R coding a bijection between A and the subproper-
ties of B.
We are now in a position 1 to define CH, CH2, and NCH2.
ðCHÞ 8x ðaleph-1ðxÞ $ continuumðxÞÞ
ðCH2Þ 8X ðaleph-1ðXÞ $ continuumðXÞÞ
ðNCH2Þ 8X ðaleph-1ðXÞ ! ‰continuumðXÞÞ
Note that in the presence of ZFC, ‰CH is equivalent to the first-order
counterpart of NCH2, namely,
8x ðaleph-1ðxÞ ! ‰continuumðxÞÞ
Finally, we need some notation to distinguish between the two notions
of validity relevant to our discussion. By ValST we denote the usual
set-theoretic definition of validity as truth in all set-theoretic
models. By ValHO we denote the higher-order definition of validity
given in §7.
9.2 Proofs
We now proceed to prove the results discussed in the main body of the
article. We begin by showing that the entanglement of second-order
logic with CH can be established in ZFC when the semantics is set-
theoretic. To this end, we first prove a lemma showing that, in the
set-theoretic semantics, second-order cardinality notions mirror the
corresponding set-theoretic ones. As usual, set-theoretic models of
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second-order logic will be ordered pairs consisting of a domain and a
valuation function.
Lemma 1. Assume ZFC. Let m ¼ hd, vi be a model of second-order
logic. Then m infiniteðXÞ if and only if v(X) is infinite. The same
holds of the other notions defined above: FINITE, ALEPH-0, ALEPH-1, and
CONTINUUM.
Proof. Suppose that m infiniteðXÞ. Note that INFINITE(X) abbre-
viates the following formula:
9F9Y ðY @X ^ X ﬃF Y Þ
By the definition of satisfaction in set-theoretic semantics, it follows
that there are f  d  d and y  vðXÞ such that vðXÞ ﬃf y. Thus v(X)
is infinite.
For the other direction, suppose that vðXÞ  d is infinite. Then there
are f and y  vðXÞ such that vðXÞ ﬃf y. Since vðXÞ  d, y  d.
Therefore f  d  d. It follows that, relative to m, f and y witness
the existential quantifiers in the formula displayed above. Thus
m infiniteðXÞ.
The proofs for the other notions are similar. h
Theorem 2. Assume ZFC. Then CH is true if and only if ValSTðCH2Þ
holds.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, suppose that CH is true but
ValST(CH2) does not hold. This implies that there is a model
m ¼ hd, vi such that m 6 CH2. In turn, this implies that there is
some a  d witnessing the falsity of CH2. By Lemma 1, it follows
that a is aleph-1 but not continuum, which contradicts CH.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose that ValST(CH2) holds.
Then for every model m, mCH2. In particular, mCH2, where
m ¼ hPðNÞ, vi and v is any valuation function. It follows from
Lemma 1 that for every a  PðNÞ, a is aleph-1 if and only if a is
continuum. That is, CH is true. h
Theorem 3. Assume ZFC. Then CH fails if and only if ValSTðNCH2Þ.
Proof. Note that, by Cardinal Comparability, we have the following
cardinality facts. For any sets a and b, if a and b are both aleph-1, then
there is a bijection between a and b. The same holds if a and b are both
continuum.
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For the left-to-right direction, suppose that CH and ValSTðNCH2Þ
both fail. By the set-theoretic semantics, this means that there is a
set a and a model m ¼ hd, vi with a ¼ vðXÞ  d such that
m aleph-1(X) ^ continuumðXÞ. By Lemma 1, a is both aleph-1
and continuum. Now, since CH fails, there is a set b that is either
aleph-1 but not continuum or continuum but not aleph-1. But given
the cardinality facts mentioned above, this cannot be.
For the other direction, suppose that ValST(NCH2) holds. Let
m ¼ hPðNÞ, vi, where vðXÞ ¼ PðNÞ. Since ValST(NCH2) holds,
m aleph-1(X) ! ‰continuumðXÞ. That is, m continuumðXÞ
! ‰aleph-1(X). By Lemma 1, it follows that if PðNÞ is continuum,
it is not aleph-1. Now it is easy to show that PðNÞ is continuum.
Therefore PðNÞ is not aleph-1. But the existence of a set, such as
PðNÞ, that is continuum but not aleph-1 is a counterexample to
CH. h
We now turn to a higher-order interpretation of logical validity.
Equivalence Lemma. CH2 is true if and only if ValHOðCH2Þ holds.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is straightforward. For the other dir-
ection, suppose that CH2 is true, and suppose for contradiction that
ValHO(CH2) does not hold. This means that there are U and E such
that CH2½E= 2U is not true. But since CH2 is a pure sentence of
second-order logic, CH2½E= 2U is equivalent to CH2U . Thus,
CH2U must be false, which means that there is a domain U and a
subproperty F of U such that it is not the case that aleph-1(F)U if and
only if continuumðFÞU .
Now since CH2 holds, then it holds a fortiori with respect to F vU .
But note that if aleph-1(F), then aleph-1(F)U. This is because F vU
and all quantifiers in aleph-1(F) range over subproperties of F and
relations whose field is F. Similarly, if continuumðFÞ, then
continuumðFÞU . To prove this conditional, suppose
that continuumðFÞ. By definition, this means that there is a
property G and a relation R such that aleph-0(G) and R codes a
bijection between F and the subproperties of G. To show that
continuumðFÞU , it is enough to show that there is a bijection between
F and an aleph-1 subproperty of F such that the field of the bijection
is F. To this end, let H be a property which applies to all and only the
elements of F that, relative to R, code a singleton subproperty of G. So
H @ F and H ﬃ G, hence aleph-0(H). Moreover, since H ﬃ G and R
codes a bijection between F and the subproperties of G, it follows that
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there is some R0 which codes a bijection between F and the subpro-
perties of H. Given that H @ F vU and the field of R0 is F vU , we can
conclude that continuumðFÞU .
Since by assumption aleph-1(F) if and only if continuumðFÞ,
we have that aleph-1(F)U if and only if continuumðFÞU , which
contradicts the supposition that CH2U is false. h
We can now prove the two Negative Theorems. Together with the
Equivalence Lemma, they show that if we switch to higher-order se-
mantics, the entanglement of second-order logic with CH can no
longer be established in the presence of the set-theoretic resources
available in ZFC. We work in ZFC together with the assumption
that there is an v-model of ZFC. This is a model whose natural num-
bers are isomorphic to N.
First Negative Theorem. ZFC does not prove that if CH2, then CH.
Proof. Suppose that there is a (set-theoretic) v-model of ZFC. This is
also a model of ZFCþ ConðZFCÞ. By forcing, we obtain an v-model
m1 of ZFCþ ConðZFCÞ þ CH. Since m1 satisfies ConðZFCÞ, it thinks—
again via forcing — that there is a model m2 ¼ hd2, v2i of ZFCþ ‰CH.
Now, from the perspective of m1, there is a model m3 ¼ hd2, v3i of
L22, where v3 is any valuation function which agrees with v2 on the
first-order fragment of the language. Since m3 is a full model (from
m1’s perspective) and agrees with v2 on the membership relation, m3 is
a model of ZFC þ ‰CH. Note that since m1 satisfies ZFC and CH, it
thinks by Theorem 2 that every full model of L22 satisfies CH2. Thus,
in particular, m1 thinks that m3 satisfies CH2. So m1, an v-model,
thinks that the theory ZFC þ ‰CHþ CH2 is consistent. But consist-
ency facts are arithmetical facts. Thus the theory ZFC þ ‰CHþ CH2
is consistent. h
Second Negative Theorem. ZFC does not prove that if CH, then
CH2.
Proof. Suppose that there is an v-model of ZFC. This is also a model
of ZFCþ ConðZFCÞ. By forcing, we obtain an v-model m1 of
ZFCþ ConðZFCÞ þ ‰CH. Since m1 satisfies ConðZFCÞ, it thinks—
again via forcing — that there is a model m2 ¼ hd2, v2i of ZFCþ CH.
Now, from the perspective of m1, there is a full model m3 ¼ hd2, v3i
of L22, where v3 is any valuation function that agrees with v2 on the
first-order fragment of the language. It follows that m3 satisfies
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ZFC þ CH. Note that, in virtue of the Upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
Theorem, we can assume that d2 is uncountable from m1’s perspective.
Since m1 satisfies ZFC and ‰CH, it thinks by Theorem 3 that every
full model ofL22 satisfies NCH2. So m1 thinks that m3 satisfies NCH2.
This implies that m3 satisfies ‰CH2, as shown by the following rea-
soning. Suppose for contradiction that m3 satisfies CH2. Because m3
also satisfies NCH2, it must satisfy ‰9X aleph-1(X). However, m1
thinks that d2 is uncountable and hence that its powerset contains
an aleph-1 set. By Lemma 1, this contradicts the fact that m3 satisfies
‰9X aleph-1(X).
Thus m1, an v-model, thinks that the theory ZFC
 þ CHþ ‰CH2
is consistent, as witnessed by m3. But again, consistency facts are
arithmetical facts. Hence the theory ZFC þ CHþ ‰CH2 is consist-
ent. h
The Negative Theorems can be generalized to the second-order
closure of any first-order theory which has an v-model over which
we can force CH and its negation. In particular, they apply to the
second-order closures of von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del and Morse-
Kelley set theory.
We now consider what happens when set theory and higher-order
resources interact in the metatheory. In particular, we show that CH2
and CH are equivalent over ZFC2. To establish these results, we need a
number of preliminary lemmas. Note that the following results are all
syntactic. We work in ZFC2.
The first set of lemmas shows that if a set a has one of the cardin-
ality properties with which we are concerned, then so does Xa.
Lemma 4. If a is infinite, then Xa is INFINITE. Moreover, if a is finite,
then Xa is FINITE.
Proof. Suppose a is infinite. So there is some b  a and f such that
b ﬃf a. By second-order Comprehension using f as parameter, it fol-
lows that there is some F such that Xb ﬃF Xa, where of course Xb@Xa.
That is, Xa is INFINITE.
For the second part of the lemma, suppose for contradiction that a
is finite but Xa is INFINITE. Since Xa is INFINITE, there is some Z @Xa and
F such that Z ﬃF Xa. By second-order Separation, which follows from
the Replacement Axiom, Z forms a set and fZg  a. By second-order
Separation again, there is a function f corresponding to F. That is:
8x8y ðhx, yi 2 f $ FxyÞ
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Thus fZg ﬃf a, which contradicts the supposition that a is finite. h
Lemma 5.
(a) If a is aleph-0, then Xa is ALEPH-0.
(b) If a is aleph-1, then Xa is ALEPH-1.
(c) If a is continuum, then Xa is CONTINUUM.
Proof. For (a), suppose that a is aleph-0. This means that a is infinite
and every b  a is either finite or there is some f such that b ﬃf a. By
Lemma 4, Xa is infinite. Now consider any Z @Xa. By second-order
Separation, {Z} forms a set and fZg  a. If {Z} is finite, then Z is finite,
by Lemma 4. If there is some f such that fZg ﬃf a, then by second-
order Comprehension there is some F such that Z ﬃF Xa. Therefore,
Xa is ALEPH-0.
Similar reasoning establishes (b).
For (c), suppose that a is continuum. Then there is some f and b
such that a ﬃf PðbÞ, where b is aleph-0. By (a), Xb is ALEPH-0. Let R be
defined by the following condition:
8x8yðRxy $ y 2 f ðxÞÞ
By second-order Comprehension, R exists. It is easy to verify that R
codes a bijection between Xa and the subproperties of Xb. Thus since
Xb is ALEPH-0, Xa is CONTINUUM. h
The second set of lemmas shows that if X has one of the cardinality
properties with which we are concerned, then so does {X} (if it exists).
Lemma 6. Assume that {X} exists. If X is INFINITE, then {X} is infinite.
If X is FINITE, then {X} is finite.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4. h
Lemma 7. Assume that {X} exists. Then:
(a) If X is ALEPH-0, then {X} is aleph-0.
(b) If X is ALEPH-1, then {X} is aleph-1.
(c) If X is CONTINUUM, then {X} is continuum.
Proof. For (a), suppose that X is ALEPH-0. Since X is INFINITE, by Lemma
6, {X} is infinite. Let b  fXg. Since X is ALEPH-0 and Xb  X , then
either Xb is FINITE or there is some F such that Xb ﬃF X . If Xb is FINITE,
then by Lemma 6, b is finite. If there is some F such that Xb ﬃF X ,
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then it follows from second-order Separation that there is some f such
that b ﬃf fXg. Thus {X} is aleph-0.
Similar reasoning establishes (b).
For (c), suppose that X is CONTINUUM. Then there is a relation R that
codes a bijection between X and the subproperties of B, where B is
ALEPH-0. Since {X} exists, it follows from second-order
Comprehension, Separation and Replacement that {B} exists. For,
using R as a parameter in second-order Comprehension, we can
define a relation R0 restricting R to the codes of subproperties of B
satisfied by a single object. By second-order Separation, the domain
of R0 forms a set c  fXg. By second-order Replacement, the range
of R0 forms a set coextensive with B. Thus {B} exists. Since B is
ALEPH-0, it follows from Lemma 7 that {B} is aleph-0. Now, second-
order Separation implies that each subproperty of B forms a set and
that there is some f such that fXg ﬃf PðfBgÞ. So {X} is continuum. h
First Positive Theorem. If CH2, then CH.
Proof. Suppose CH2, that is, for every X, X is ALEPH-1 if and only if X is
CONTINUUM. Let a be an arbitrary set. To establish CH, it suffices to
show that a is aleph-1 if and only if a is continuum.
Assume that a is aleph-1. By Lemma 5, Xa is ALEPH-1. It follows from
CH2 that Xa is CONTINUUM. Lemma 7 then implies that a is continuum.
The other direction is proved similarly. h
In the proof of the second Positive Theorem, we invoke the follow-
ing Lemma, which can be easily established using appropriate in-
stances of second-order Comprehension.
Lemma 8. If A and B are both ALEPH-0, then there is a bijection
between A and B. The same holds if A and B are both ALEPH-1 or
CONTINUUM.
The proof of this lemma uses Property Comparability, that is, the state-
ment that for any two properties A and B, there is either an injection of
A into B or an injection of B into A. Note that this is a higher-order
statement and does not follow from its set-theoretic counterpart,
Cardinal Comparability. However, it is equivalent over the axioms of
ZFC2 to the second-order version of the Axiom of Choice.13
13 In the context of ZFC, three principles are famously known to be equivalent: the Axiom
of Choice, the Well-Ordering Principle, and Cardinal Comparability. With regard to their
second-order counterparts, the situation is as follows. In the context of pure second-order
logic, the Global Well-Ordering Principle, that is, the second-order statement that the universe
can be well-ordered, implies Property Comparability, but it is not known whether the converse
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Second Positive Theorem. If CH, then CH2.
Proof. Suppose CH. ZFC proves that there is a set a that is aleph-0.
Now, PðaÞ is continuum and hence, by CH, aleph-1. By Lemma 5, we
have that Xa is ALEPH-0, and XPðaÞ is ALEPH-1 and CONTINUUM.
Let X be an arbitrary property. We want to show that X is ALEPH-1 if
and only if it is CONTINUUM. For the left-to-right direction, suppose
that X is ALEPH-1. Given that X and XPðaÞ are both ALEPH-1, it follows
from Lemma 8 that there is some F such that X ﬃF XPðaÞ. This implies
that X is CONTINUUM, given that XPðaÞ is CONTINUUM.
The right-to-left direction is proved similarly. h
Counterparts of the above theorems hold for NCH2 and the neg-
ation of CH. The proofs of the two Negative Theorems can be easily
adapted. As before, we work in ZFC with the assumption that there is
an v-model of ZFC. Then we have:
Theorem 9. ZFC does not prove that if NCH2, then ‰CH.
Theorem 10. ZFC does not prove that if ‰CH, then NCH2.
Similarly, reasoning in ZFC2, one can prove counterparts of the the
two Positive Theorems.
Theorem 11. If NCH2, then ‰CH.
Theorem 12. If ‰CH, then NCH2.
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